Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2019

Narrowing the Theory’s or Study’s Scope May Increase Practical Relevance
Mikko Siponen
University of Jyvaskyla, Faculty
of Information Technology P.O.
Box 35, FI-40014 University of
Jyvaskyla, Finland
mikko.t.siponen@jyu.fi

Tuula Klaavuniemi
Oncology Department, Southern
Savonia Central Hospital
tuula.klaavuniemi@fimnet.fi

Abstract

the RW; hence, the results should not be generalized to
other types of IT workers or organizations.” To give
another example, “Our findings should be interpreted
in light of the limitations of this work. First, data were
collected from two organizations that were of similar
size and with similar operations in the same industry.
Although this helped us control for possible industry
differences, it limits the generalizability of our
findings…Second, data were collected in the context of
a specific ES implementation: a SAP ERP system. It is
possible that our results would be different in other
ERP systems..” [3 p. 1135].
Baskerville and Lee [1 p. 49] claimed that “It is
incorrect and even harmful that many information
systems researchers typically criticize their own
intensive (qualitative, interpretive, critical, and case)
research as lacking generalizability.” Influential
sources suggest that such lack of generalizability
claims results because qualitative studies have to meet
the standard of a statistical, sample-based conception
of generalizability [4].1 However, in the two examples
above, the generalizability concern is not statistical
generalizability; e.g., it does not relate to sample size
adequateness. Findings regarding the “type of IT
workers” are not generalizable to other IT workers [2].
In addition, “different ERPs” and “industry type” may
not be transferable to other ERPs and industry types
[3]. Nevertheless, in our experience, such a lack of
generalizability can qualify as a reason to reject papers
in top IS journals.
What do these examples demonstrate, if not issues
of statistical generalizability? The point is not that
theory contextualizations are not preferred. We suggest
the interpretation that they stem from study, model, or
theory scope preferences. For example, “an often
admired quality of theories in natural sciences is their
applicability to a range of settings” [5 p. 35].
Generalizability is also seen as the fundamental aim of

Numerous articles in top IS journals note as a
limitation and lack of generalizability that their
findings are specific to a certain type of technology,
culture, and so on. We argue that this generalizability
concern is about limited scope (e.g., explanatory
breadth). The IS literature notes this preference for
generalizability as a characteristic of good science and
it
is
sometimes
confused
with
statistical
generalizability We argue that such generalizability
can be in conflict with explanation or prediction
accuracy. An increase in scope (e.g., increasing
explanatory breadth) can decrease explanation or
prediction accuracy. Thus, in sciences such as cancer
research, where explanation and prediction accuracy
are highly valued, the cancer accounts (generally
speaking) have become increasingly narrower (and
less generalizable). IS thinking has not yet benefitted
from these considerations. Whether generalizability is
valued should be linked with the research aims. If the
aim is practical applicability through explanation or
prediction accuracy, then “limited” generalizability
could be a strength rather than a weakness.

1. Introduction
The term generalizability is widely used in IS
research articles, often in the limitations section,
describing the lack of generalizability as a study
limitation [1]. Typically, IS studies note that some of
their findings are specific to a certain type of
technology, country or organizational culture, and so
on. For example, a study in India or Sweden may have
India- or Sweden-specific findings, which are not
applicable (generalizable) to outside of India or
Sweden. Such India- or Sweden-specific findings are
then noted as a limitation. As a concrete example, [2 p.
11] reported that “it is important to acknowledge
several limitations. First, all data were collected from
one organization, with one type of IT professional—
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“Published Research that Applies the Statistical, Sampling-Based
Conception of Generalizability to Nonstatistical, Nonsampling
Research” [4 p. 223]. Also: “researchers should not give up claims to
generality on the basis of…small n,” and they should have a “right to
generalize and claim generality” [1 p. 61, 63].
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sciences in IS [6]. This preference is also attributed to
basic research and practical applicability [4 p. 221]:
“the generalizability of an IS theory to different
settings is important not only for purposes of basic
research, but also for purposes of managing and
solving problems that corporations and other
organizations experience in society.” Similarly, Weber
[7 p. 15] noted that “Some theories cover a very
narrow, constrained set of phenomena. Because of the
limited range of phenomena it covers, however, it runs
the risk it will be deemed uninteresting and
unimportant.” Moreover, Davison and Martinsons [8 p.
242] noted that “research that is relevant for and
applicable to a wider range of phenomena is
traditionally considered to be more useful.” Finally,
“Presumably, the wider the range of the theory’s
application, the more generalizability it offers and the
stronger the theory” [9 p. 9]. We are not aware of any
IS study that suggests that a narrower range makes a
theory stronger or more useful.
These IS views make sense (with certain
reservations) if the IS phenomenon is governed by
laws. In the past, philosophers who assumed true laws,
such as Fresner, Newton [10], and Lavoisier, outlined
preferences according to which a wider explanatory
breadth beat a narrower one. Moreover, Whewell,
many figureheads of logical empiricism (e.g., Hempel),
and analytical philosophers (e.g., Friedman and
Kitcher) regarded the widening of explanatory breadth
as an aim of science.
However, over the last 40 years or so, it has also
become well documented in philosophy of science
journals that generalizability issues are not that
straightforward, even in the fields where we most
expect them (e.g., in physics). Even the fundamental
laws of physics might not be truly generalizable; they
apply only in highly idealized counterfactual
conditions [11]. Moreover, it is widely reported in
many sciences that an increase in explanatory breadth
(e.g., generalizability) often decreases explanation
accuracy or prediction accuracy. Similarly, increasing
realism tends to decrease explanatory breadth
(“generalizability” decreased). For example, in cancer
research, efforts to obtain increasingly better 1)
explanation accuracy and 2) prediction accuracy have
resulted in cancer accounts becoming increasingly
narrower (progressively less generalizable). Moreover,
highly specific treatments, which, in IS terms, would
have a “lack of generalizability,” have been introduced.
IS thinking has not yet benefitted from these
“generalizability” considerations that have featured in
many sciences. Several hundred papers have been
written about this topic in philosophy of science
journals under technical jargon, which may appear
foreign to IS readers.

We explain some of these technical concepts to IS
readers in anticipation that IS researchers will
understand that narrowing scope is not tantamount to
narrowing contributions. For example, if there is no
need for explanation accuracy (or prediction accuracy)
and a high level of realism, then the scope of the study
or theory could be wide, and “lack of generalizability”
can be seen as a demerit. However, if explanation or
prediction accuracy is highly valued, then theories or
studies may become increasingly narrower (and less
generalizable) in indeterministic settings. In such
cases, what has thus far been seen as “lack of
generalizability” in IS could be seen not as a limitation,
but as a merit of a study.

2. Preference for statistical generalizability
or unification
Influential sources argue that qualitative studies are
required to meet the standard of statistical, samplebased conception of generalizability [1, 4]. What could
these sample-based generalization issues be? For
example, you have 20 interviews, and the reviewers
ask that you do (say) 100 more in order to have
statistical power to claim (statistical generalizability)
[12]. Lee and Baskerville [4] maintained that such a
requirement for qualitative studies is unjustified. We
agree that the requirement of statistical generalizability
– e.g., high sample size – for all qualitative studies
misunderstand the purpose of qualitative research.
Having said that, we suggest that the evidence
provided by Lee and Baskerville [4] points to concerns
other than statistical generalizability (and sample size).
Lee and Baskerville [4 p. 223] presented 12 examples
of “Published Research that Applies the Statistical,
Sampling-Based Conception of Generalizability to
Nonstatistical, Nonsampling Research: Examples from
Case Research.” We do not doubt that this may
happen. However, many (if not all) of Lee and
Baskerville’s [4 p. 223] examples could be interpreted
as presenting cases in which the authors discussed
concerns other than applying “the Statistical,
Sampling-Based Conception of Generalizability to
Nonstatistical, Nonsampling Research” [4]. For
example, Robey and Sahay, in the example cited by
Lee and Baskerville [4 p. 223], noted that “each
context is different so we should expect different
contextual elements… The findings should not even be
extended to other settings... What is true for GIS in the
two local country governments studied may be untrue
for GIS in other governmental units or in private
enterprise.”
Robey and Sahay noted that “each context is
different,” and thus, “these findings should not even be
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extended to other settings.” Robey and Sahay might
not have referred to sample size adequateness; rather,
“findings should not even be extended to other
settings,” and they may not refer to statistical
generalizability2. Instead, “each context is different”
implies that some explanans3 are expected to be
different per context. In the case of Robey and Sahay,
organization-specific explanans clarify why findings
“should not even be extended to other settings.” The
more organization-specific explanans there are, the
fewer findings are transferrable or generalizable to all
organizations. Discussion of organization (or context)
specific explanans as a “lack of generalizability” is not
necessarily
the
same
thing
as
statistical
generalizability. In IS, both concerns are discussed
under generalizability. We suggest that in many of the
examples
by
[4],
the
authors
refer
to
explanans/explanandum
differences
and
not
necessarily
“the
Statistical,
Sampling-Based
Conception of Generalizability.” The authors [4] and
their critic [13] do not discuss this possibility.
A simple example hopefully clarifies the difference
between these two types of generalizability claims4.
Let us assume that we found that explanans A (e.g., a
set of dynamic mechanisms) explains cancer subtype 1
(but not subtype 2), and explanans B explains cancer
subtype 2 (but not subtype 1). In IS jargon, the findings
from cancer subtype 1 are not generalizable to subtype
2 (and vice versa). However, this “lack of
generalizability” has nothing do with the “Statistical,
Sampling-Based Conception of Generalizability” [4].
Different cancers have different explanans (e.g., cancer
subtype 1 is explained by different explanans from
cancer subtype 2). If this is the case, then no statistical
technique or increase in sample size can change this
outcome. This is because the explanans are different,
and an increase in sample size cannot make the
explanans the same. Lee and Baskerville [36] seemed
to discuss such issues as “Published Research that
Applies the Statistical, Sampling-Based Conception of
Generalizability to Nonstatistical, Nonsampling
Research.” In addition, numerous articles in MISQ
2

E.g., statistical generalizability “consists of generalizing from
research findings about the sample to those same characteristics in
the corresponding population” [13 p. 19]
3
Term explanandum (plural explananda) refers to a phenomenon
that is explained [14]. Explanans (plural explanantia) explains the
explanandum [14]. Originally, explanans were laws (and initial
conditions) [14]. In contemporary philosophy of science, explanans
can be other than laws, e.g., mechanism, factors, variables, causes,
powers, events, process – virtually anything that accounts for the
explanandum.
4
This is not an analogy between the Robey and Sahay example. The
point is to illustrate how explanans differences are different from the
“Statistical, Sampling-Based Conception of Generalizability”.

applied qualitative and quantitative methods and
discussed such context-specific findings as limitations
and lack of generalizability. For example, findings on
“type of IT workers” are not generalizable to other IT
workers [2], and “different ERPs” and “industry type”
may not be transferable to other ERPs and industry
types [3]. In these examples, the generalizability
concern is not sample size adequateness in claiming
statistical power and generalizability. Why are such
findings regarded as limitations and a “lack of
generalizability” in IS rather than as strengths?
Assume that previous research had a cancer-typespecific theory (say, a lymphoma-specific theory) that
explained all types of lymphomas; then, later, it was
found that lymphomas could be classified as nonHodgkin versus Hodgkin lymphomas [15, 16] that
have different explanans and, therefore, subtypespecific treatments. In cancer research, this is
understood as positive progress, not a limitation or
“lack of generalizability.” If it was found that patients
with cancer subtype A are better off with specific
treatment X, and cancer subtype B requires specific
treatment Y, then describing such a finding as a lack of
generalizability and a limitation would be odd, even
though the results would be cancer-type-specific and
could not be generalized to other cancers or even other
lymphomas.
However, regarding such findings as implying a
lack of generalizability or a limitation is
understandable if there is a priori belief that a broad
theory or study scope is better than a narrow one, as
proposed by unificationists from Whewell [17] to
Kitcher [18] (see next section). If the aim of the
science is unifying (e.g., “finding common explanans
across cancers, IT use or social media use”) rather than
dis-unifying (e.g., finding cancer-specific explanans or
finding how the use of a certain type of computer game
is different from a smartphone or a wide-screen
computer), such views make sense. We have observed
beliefs pertaining to scopes that are perceived as too
narrow by top IS journal editors. For example, it was
proposed by an SE that a study or theory that explained
only Facebook (FB) use was not acceptable in a top IS
journal because it did not explain other types of social
media uses. Similarly, a study or theory of password
selection was regarded as unacceptable because, for
many reviewers/editors, “acceptable” studies or
theories should explain a number of different IS
security behaviors. These questions are often discussed
as a lack of generalizability in IS. However, the
concern is not about sample size or other statistical
generalization issue, but rather whether FB use can be
different from other types of social media use. FB use
theory would have a narrower scope than a theory that
explains all kinds of social media usages. Similarly, a
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theory/study on password selection would be narrower
in scope than a theory/study that explains many kinds
of IS security behaviors. These generalizability
concerns implicitly assume unification preferences. We
discuss these next.

3. Unification and laws
There are important differences between different
sciences within the natural sciences and between the
social and natural sciences. However, the IS
discussions on (non-statistical) generalizability are not
thus far related to such differences. The need for
generalizability is justified or introduced as a general
scientific preference. For example, IS views refer to
“natural sciences” [5 p. 35] and “basic research” [4 p.
221]. Similarly, there is the claim that “generalizability
should be given a higher position in the scientific
process and the ultimate goal” is based on sciences in
general rather than specific characteristics of IS or
social sciences [6]. Finally, Davison and Martinsons [8
p. 242] noted that “research that is relevant for and
applicable to a wider range of phenomena is
traditionally considered to be more useful.” Again,
they [8] do not claim that this particular observation is
specific to any particular science.
Since these IS views refer to natural science, basic
research, and the goal of sciences in general, we shall
now review what has been written on this topic in
philosophy of science journals. The terms used are
consilience of inductions, common cause, explanatory
unification,
explanation
simplification,
logical
unification, derivational unification, value conflicts,
etc. An overview of these concepts will shed new light
on current IS practice and views on scope.

3.1. Laws and scope
It was once taken for granted that the scientific
theories are (mainly) true laws. With the standard law
concept, the issue of scope was straightforward:
“Traditionally, the word ‘laws’ has been reserved for
universally applicable, exceptionless generalizations”
[19 p. 731]. For example, Popper [20] regarded
theories as laws that were 100% exception-less [21;
19]5. The paradigmatic case for laws was Newton’s
law of gravitation [22 p. 409]. Newton’s theory
“originally claimed to apply to all bodies through the
universe at all times” [22 p. 409].
Many philosophers, who assumed that scientific
theories are laws, outlined theory scope preferences,
known as unification. But what is unification? This is
5

“Scientific law” means “Of all points in space and time (or in all
regions of space and time) it is true that” [20 p. 68].

what we discuss next. This discussion is important
because many IS views on generalizability may
implicitly or explicitly reflect this view.
Whewell [17] outlined a classical account
“consilience of inductions.” He claimed that “a test of
the truth of the theory” is when a hypothesis explains
more than “one class of facts” or when it predicts the
“cases of a kind different from those which were
contemplated in the formation of our hypothesis” [17].
For example, Whewell’s [17] first requirement can be
seen as unification and simplification [23]. Let us
presume that different hypotheses explain Facebook
(FB) use and Twitter use, and then, a new hypothesis
(H3) explains both FB and Twitter use. Explanation
simplification happens only if one hypothesis can
explain both (instead of two). H3 has a wider scope
than H1 and H2 in terms of the number of phenomena
explained. Whewell’s view can be interpreted in terms
of simplification, common cause, or a hypothesis’
scope or “explanatory breadth.”6
Whewell’s [17] doctrine was influential. A number
of major thinkers, including Jevons, Fowler, Pierce,
and Popper, agreed with Whewell that the best theory
or hypothesis “is the one which has predicted new
phenomena, explained phenomena of different kinds”
[23 p. 177]. For example, Thagard [24 p. 30] reported
“explanatory breadth” as a key criterion for evaluating
theories, which means that “one theory has more
explanatory breadth than its competitor if it explains
more classes of facts.” Numerous philosophers have
outlined various unification theories, including
Friedman’s [25] explanatory unification, Mäki’s [26]
logical unification, Mäki’s [27] derivational
unification, and Kitcher’s [18] explanatory unification.
We can summarize these accounts with the following
simplifying statement. An increase in explananda
(number of phenomena explained or predicted)
increases the scope (or breadth) of a model or theory.
In this case, (non-statistical) generalizability increases.
Let us assume that it is believed that a set of explanans
A explains Twitter use and a set of explanans B
explains FB use. Now, presume a new study that
suggests that a set of explanans C explains both
Twitter and FB use. With this new study, explanandum
unification has occurred. Previously (in our example),
Twitter and FB use was explained by a different set of
explanans. This new study suggests the same
6

If H1 explains FB use and H2 explains Twitter use, then the new
H3 seems to constitute both simpler explanations for the class “social
media” but not for those of FB and Twitter. This is because both still
have equally many numbers of explanatory reasons (hypotheses).
However, in this simple example, H3 could be a common cause for
FB and Twitter, while H1 and H2 could be separate causes. In this
case, the “explanatory breadth” of H3 would be wider than those of
H1 and H2.
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explanans for Twitter and FB use. It can be regarded as
introducing explanandum unification because it has
unified two phenomena (Twitter and FB use), which
were previously regarded as two different phenomena
(because they had different sets of explanans: A and
B). At the same time, the range of explanandum has
increased with the new study. The new study can
explain FB and Twitter use; while the previous
accounts could only explain one.
In turn, a decrease in explananda narrows the
scope, and (non-statistical) generalizability decreases.
In the case of studies that explain, a decrease in
explananda decreases explanatory breadth. Let us
presume that according to paper 1, FB and Twitter
have the same set of explanans. If one later shows in
study 2 that they have different explanans, then disunification has happened. In addition, non-statistical
generalizability has decreased from paper 1 to paper 2.
That is to say that the scope of paper 2 is narrower than
that of paper 1.
Classical unificationists from Whewell to Kitcher
would not have appreciated what we have called a
decrease in explananda. However, there are often other
important concerns at stake, which were not taken into
account in these classical unificationists’ doctrines.
Next, we explain what these concerns are. This
discussion helps us understand that narrowing the
scope (a decrease in explananda and a decrease in nonstatistical generalizability) can be very important in
many cases.

4. Value conflicts: accuracy versus scope
For Laudan [28], theories are solutions to important
problems. Laudan [28 p. 35] introduced the terms
comparative generality and weighting by generality: “if
we can show for any two [scientific] problems p’ and
p, that any solution [i.e., theories] to p’ must also
constitute a solution for p (but not visa versa) then p’ is
more general, and thus of greater weight, than p.”
Laudan [28 p. 35] called this “comparative generality.”
His example is that finding the law for the motion of
Mars has less “general comparatively” than finding the
for the motion of all planets. However, he [28 p. 35]
recognized that “there are many other cases which do
not permit one to evaluate their comparative
generality.” What does Laudan mean by this? While he
did not explain this, his former colleague provided an
explanation that shocked many philosophers. We now
turn to Kuhn.
Kuhn [29 p. 52] claimed that (what he called as)
normal science, values “the steady extension of the
scope.” However, he maintained that on a rational
basis, scientists even within one discipline could not
agree on the precise meaning of this concept. Scientists

might agree that a wide theory scope is better than a
narrow one, but there was disagreement regarding what
this meant precisely [29, 30]. Let us illustrate this idea
with IS examples. Lee and Baskerville [4] discussed
generalizability in terms of “different contexts.” [31]
discussed the importance of generalizability, which
was termed “applicability to different environments”
and “a variety of contexts.” A Kuhnian might claim
that scholars often agree with some concepts, say, that
the study should be applicable to a “variety of
contexts,” but they cannot agree on a rational basis
regarding when precisely a study meets these goals.
For example, does a case study of two organizations
meet a “variety of contexts” or “different contexts”?
Moreover, due to value conflicts, the issue becomes
even more challenging, according to Kuhn [30 p. 262]:
“In many concrete situations, different values,
though all constitutive of good reason, dictate different
conclusions, different choices. In such cases of valueconflict (e.g., one theory is simpler but one is more
accurate) the relative weight placed on different values
by different individuals can play a decisive role in
choice. More important, though scientists share these
values…, they do not all apply them in the same way.
Simplicity, scope, fruitfulness, and even accuracy can
be judged quite differently…by different people”.
Here, Kuhn introduced a term that has been very
important in science, although we have not yet
discussed it: accuracy (or precision). Before we discuss
this concept, it is important to note that in biology,
biochemistry, or cancer research, explanations are not
primarily law-based, but mechanism-based [21, 32].
Mechanism-based
accounts
in
biology
and
biochemistry are commonly regarded as “highly
particularized” [21 p. 763]. Also, laws are questionable
in social science [33].
Moreover, since the 1970s, philosophers have
reported that even the fundamental laws of physics are
not really true (exception-less) laws: “fundamental
laws are not true, nor nearly true, nor true for the most
part [11 p. 175]. For example, “Newton’s first
law…refers to what happens to a body that is subject to
no external forces, but there are probably no such
bodies” [34 p. 358]. As a final example, Nagel [35 p.
131] reported that “It is common if not normal for a
theory to be formulated in terms of ideal concepts such
as…perfect vacuum, infinitely slow expansion, perfect
elasticity…” Ideal concepts are “simplifying falsehoods” [36 p. 242]. For example, assuming a perfect
vacuum, which some theories of physics do, is a
deliberate false representation of the phenomenon [37,
38]. As a result, even fundamental laws of physics
either 1) make true claims, which apply only in highly
idealized counterfactual settings, or 2) make false
claims about how things are in actual settings [11]. For
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example, “how few are the known exact, true, and
general laws that apply to actual as opposed to ideal
conditions. They may be none at all” [19 p. 730]. Thus,
“even our best theories [in physics] are severely
limited in their scope.” [39 p. 13].
4.1 Science examples of accuracy versus scope
Explanation and prediction (accuracy) can be two
different things. Explanation and prediction do not
necessarily go hand in hand, a point not taken into
account by, for example, the Hempel and Oppenheim
[14] model. For instance, a prediction can be accurate,
but an explanation might be less accurate or unknown.
A case in point is that even though the detailed
molecular mechanism of rituximab (a cancer drug) is
not well understood, rituximab is a scientifically
accepted treatment. The reason for this is related to the
drug’s effectiveness. We might call that prediction
accuracy. What does this mean? Take, for instance, an
example of cancer treatment for one type of cancer:
diffuse large B-cell lymphoma (DLBCL). One
treatment combines rituximab and chemotherapy. For
example, in DLBCL, at the 2-year follow-up point,
70% of patients treated with rituximab and
chemotherapy were alive, compared to 57% who
received only chemotherapy [40]. The prediction
accuracy of chemotherapy in DLBCL can be said to be
57%, while that of rituximab combined with
chemotherapy is 70%. However, prediction accuracy
can be seen as a statistical average. In practice, this
means that the effect of chemotherapy (treatments)
varies from patient to patient. One might die before the
two-year follow-up; another might be alive up to that
point or even longer; for a third patient, the
chemotherapy can have lethal side effects. Prediction
accuracy rate studies may also vary from one study to
another, for example, because cancers hardly follow
laws [41], and cancer formation (carcinogenesis) is
highly dynamic and random [42].
Kuhn’s reply to value conflicts shocked many
philosophers [43]. Let us presume that two scholars
agree that a “wide theory scope is important and
(prediction) accuracy is important.” Let us presume
that they do agree what both mean precisely, which
Kuhn [29] denied. Let us say that the wide theory
scope means a “theory that explains two types of
cancers is better than a theory that explains one type of
cancer.” Let us also presume that scholars agree on
what accuracy means: it is the overall survival rate or
the percentage of patients who are still alive after the
(say) 2-year follow-up point (“prediction accuracy”).
Let us presume that we have theory 1 (T1), which
explains and has a treatment for two types of cancers A
and B. Then we have two other separate theories (T2,

T3) for cancers A and B. T2 can account only for
cancer A (and nothing more), while T3 explains only
cancer B (and nothing else). T1 is more generalizable;
it explains cancers A and B, but its prediction accuracy
is low. Say T1 has 20% accuracy for cancer A and
15% accuracy for cancer B. In turn, T2 and T3 are less
generalizable. Each applies to only one type of cancer.
But T2 has 90% accuracy for cancer A, and T3 has
90% accuracy for cancer B (90% of patients treated
with T2- and T3-based treatments were alive at the
standard two-year follow-up point).
Kuhn [30] claimed that in such circumstances, two
scholars may diverge on which theory is better—even
though they agree that a “wide theory scope is
important and accuracy is important.” Even if they
agree on what these two values mean precisely, which
Kuhn once denied [29], they may still come to a
different conclusion about which theory is preferred,
according to Kuhn. For example, the first scholar
prefers T1, while the other scholar prefers T2 and T3.
For Kuhn, these are not a few exceptional cases. They
“are what goes on in the sciences at times of theory
choice” [44 p. 325]. Kuhn is highly skeptical that
scholars can agree in such situations; the decision is
personal and subjective. According to him, they cannot
be solved by “evidence and reason” [43 p. 14]. We
return to our cancer research example.
While T1 is more generalizable than T2 and T3, T2
and T3 have much better prediction accuracy than T1.
Our readers may disagree with Kuhn—value conflicts
could be solved. Most likely, oncologists would agree
that T2 and T3 are better than T1, although they are
less generalizable than T1. What happened here? R.M.
Hare [45] would have called this an overriding of
values. While breadth is an important value, in our
example, prediction accuracy is even more important.
In our example, we cannot have both, and prediction
accuracy overrides generalizability (explanatory
breadth). Cancer researchers and oncologists would not
necessarily trade off a specific theory to have a general
theory of cancer if the general theory is less accurate.
However, we argue that resolving such value conflicts
may be situational and dependent on the aim of the
research. In mathematical models of cancer research,
generalizability could be more important than an
accurate (and realistic) explanation or prediction,
especially when there is no direct expectation to apply
the research in practice.
Similar examples of the resolution of value
conflicts can be given in many sciences, but Kuhn [29,
30, 44] was not aware of this. In population biology,
MacArthur and Levins [46] traded off precision in
order to have better realism and wider generality.
Others [47, 48] traded off realism to have wider
generality and greater precision by including

Page 6265

knowingly unrealistic assumptions in their models.
This was also the approach in Nobel laureate
Friedman’s [49] methodology of economics. He [49]
felt that he could not have a wide scope, realism, and
accurate predictions at the same time. For him [49], a
wide scope and prediction accuracy were much more
important than realism, which he traded off. Thus, for
him, good theories in economics can have assumptions
that “never are” realistic. He purposefully traded off
realism for a wide scope and prediction accuracy. His
exemplar was physics, in general, and Galileo’s law of
fall in particular [38]. Friedman [49] knew that the law
has numerous purposefully false assumptions.
Had he looked up cancer research as an exemplar
instead of Galileo’s law, he might not have traded off
realism so easily because it would have resulted in
cancer treatments that do not work in practice. Recall
that mechanism-based explanations are commonly
regarded as highly particularized in biology [21]. As an
example of a cancer mechanism in biology and
biochemistry, the humoral theory once explained all
medical concerns from cancer to melancholy [50].
Thereafter came cancer-specific accounts, which
explained not all medical diseases, but all cancers.
Later, upon realizing that different cancers had
different complex dynamic mechanisms, cancer
research followed up, and narrower cancer-typespecific explanations were sought [50]. However,
cancer research did not stop there. There are now
hundreds of distinct cancer accounts for different types
of cancers [50]. There are cancer-specific explanations,
which may not be generalizable to any other cancers or
phenomena in science, according to current
knowledge. Similarly, there are cancer-specific drugs
that are applicable only to certain types of cancers, and
their effect may not be equally generalizable to other
types of cancers [50]. Such particularistic theorizing in
cancer research has, on its own, saved the lives of
numerous people. If scientific studies or theories must
be applicable to various different settings (e.g., explain
many types of cancers) or always toward increasingly
greater scope in order to prove that the study is good
science,
then
cancer-type-specific
theorizing
exemplifies not-so-good science. The progress of
cancer research in biology and biochemistry can be
(partly) explained by prioritizing explanation accuracy
over generalizability.

5. Discussion
A decrease in or narrowness of theory scope
does not necessarily reduce practical and scientific
relevance. Many influential IS scholars, regardless of
background, are certain that a wider scope is better
than a narrow scope, both scientifically and practically.

Alternatively, they suggest that a narrow scope is less
useful, less strong, more uninteresting, and more
unimportant than a wider scope [8 p. 24] [9 p. 9] [7 p.
15]. Such views make sense in the logical empiricist
and Popperian utopia where there are true, universal
(exception-less) laws. The extent to which such laws
exist in physics is questionable, let alone in medical
research, biochemistry, or social sciences.
Outside of such a utopian world, narrowing the
theory or study scope does not necessarily decrease
practical importance or impact. This becomes clear
when we discuss how potential scientific impacts can
be different from theory scope generality and
specificity as well as how common a problem the issue
(explanandum) is. For example, pancreatic cancer is
rarer than breast cancer. However, currently, pancreatic
cancer is a more serious problem, on average, than
breast cancer because the former is lethal in nearly all
cases (breast cancer is more often curable, if found
early enough). We may say that the impact of
pancreatic cancer is higher than that of breast cancer, if
the yardstick is lethality. In addition, the scope of
generality and specificity does not necessarily go hand
in hand with the scientific impact. Arguably, there is
something unique in the explanans of pancreatic cancer
that is not fully understood because it cannot be cured.
Who wants to claim that we should not examine lethal
pancreatic cancer even though its scope is narrow, even
though it has unique explanans and yet is rare? It is
also possible that the theory with a highly narrow
scope can have greater potential for practical impact
than a study with a more general scope. Many
scientists have recognized that narrowing the
theoretical scope may increase practical relevance. In
IS jargon, narrowing (explanatory) the scope is not
tantamount to weakening contributions. What,
therefore, indicates a narrowing scope? We discuss two
important reasons next.
Increased explanatory accuracy is one reason
why a scope is narrowed. We link explanatory
accuracy with explanans. For example, non-Hodgkin
and Hodgkin are two types of lymphomas, but why do
they require separate theorizing? The answer is
because these two lymphomas have different
explanans. If two explananda can be adequately
understood using the same explanans, then they are
most likely about the same phenomenon. If two
explananda have different explanans, then this is an
indication that these are two separate phenomena,
which may require distinct theorizing. We can have a
theory that explains both non-Hodgkin and Hodgkin
lymphomas, but this theory would be less accurate than
specific theories for each. Moreover, we also need
studies with a narrower scope, even when such
differences in explanans may not exist. For the sake of
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simplicity, let us presume that all lymphomas are either
accounted by Theory (T) 1 or T2. This we could only
know by scrutinizing all candidates for lymphomas.
This idea (differences in explanans) also applies in IS.
If people have different reasons (explanans) for using
(say) Facebook rather than (say) Twitter, then this is a
good indication that separate theorizing may be
required for each. In such a case, we can have a more
abstract and general theory that explains both
Facebook and Twitter use, but this theory may be less
accurate than specific theories for each. Moreover, the
problem with the general theory may be more than an
accuracy issue. For example, models of computer
abuse explain all types of information security policy
non-compliance issues, from not locking a computer to
reusing the same password across different accounts.
However, let us presume that reusing a password is
explained by problems with memorizing, while other
types of information security policy non-compliance
issues are not. If this were the case, then models of
computer abuse would not only be inaccurate, but
mainly inappropriate to explain password reuse
behavior.
Increased prediction accuracy is another reason
why a scope is narrowed. In medical research,
prediction accuracy is linked with the effect of the
treatment. Lymphoma-type specific or unique
treatments have a narrower scope than a “general
treatment” for all lymphomas. Why are such specific
treatments developed and used? The answer is
straightforward. It is hoped that they will be more
effective than the general treatment. In fact, a general
treatment for lymphomas can even be life threatening
for treating specific lymphomas.
What does this means for IS? We could say that
“the more effective the treatment, the better,” and this a
posteriori matter then ultimately sets the scope.
However, the issue is far from being that simple. For at
least two complex reasons, there is hardly a single
concrete solution that is universal in every IS research
area. First, what counts as “effectiveness” (prediction
accuracy) varies even within medicine. Effectiveness
means different things in cancer treatments compared
with (say) anesthesiology treatments. Similar
differences are assumed in different areas of IS. For
example, a key area in IS security is improving users’
behavior through interventions such as fear appeals.
But what counts as effectiveness is not straightforward.
For instance, are we measuring the effect right after the
intervention, two weeks later, or two months later? Do
we count the possible side effects of fear appeals (e.g.,
users stop reading security-related email)? Moreover,
not all studies can do all of these things, and such
decisions implicitly limit the scope. Finally, the same
measures of effectiveness may not work with (say) IT

use. These issues must be discussed carefully in future
IS research.
Second, prediction accuracy is also a complex
methodological issue. For example, prediction and
explanation accuracy of the same phenomenon are
typically importantly different in actual settings versus
1) counterfactual laboratory settings, 2) mathematical
models, or 3) statistical models with statistical
averages. A case in point are fundamental laws of
physics. They commonly contain purposeful false
assumptions (e.g., perfect vacuum, magnetic, and other
forces are absent; air pressure is nil) [11, 38]. Their
predictions may hold in counterfactual settings (e.g., in
laboratory, mathematical models), where these
assumptions could be met. However, in real settings
(generally speaking), their predictions can be, strictly
speaking, false [11, 51]7. In other words, the scope of a
law in physics can be made purposefully wide in a
counterfactual model (e.g., making all forces absent),
with full awareness that the model falsely describes the
actual phenomenon. Thus, the scope of a theory in a
model or theoretical settings can be wide. In real
settings, the scope of the same theory can be either
highly limited or even inapplicable (without serious
modifications). Such issues also exist in IS, albeit they
might not have been recognized. These issues have
scope implications and must be discussed and debated
in future IS research.

6. Summary
Influential IS scholars outline an a priori belief: wider
scope beats narrower scope, or studies with narrower
scope are less strong, less useful, less interesting and
less important than studies with wider scope. If we
evaluate cancer research in light of these IS views, then
both cancer biology and medical oncology have
become (generally speaking) increasingly less useful,
less strong, more uninteresting, and more unimportant
over the last 200 years. Such beliefs related to IS scope
should be rejected in their original form. However,
they are understandable, if one’s understanding of the
philosophy of science is based on the arguments of
logical empiricists (e.g., Hempel) or Popper up to the
1970s. In such a worldview, scientific theories were
true exceptionless laws, and singular events or
observations were explained by these laws. Today, it is
known that even the fundamental laws of physics do
not constitute such laws [11]. In cancer research, for
example, a phenomenon can be rare and have a narrow
7

“The models that our theories [of physics] are able to handle are
deliberate falsifications of reality…the theory may then accurately
describe the workings of the model, but the model does not describe
the phenomena.” [51 p. 200]
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scope, yet a study of it can be scientifically and
practically relevant and valuable. Narrowing the scope
does not necessarily decrease the contribution
(scientific or practical impact); it may increase it.
However, we are not saying that a narrower scope is a
priori preferred over a wider one. Our view is that in
empirical sciences (outside of logic/mathematics),
theory/study scope is not an a priori issue, but largely
an a posteriori issue. Having said that, a theory or
study scope may also be narrowed or widened in
sciences for methodological or instrumental reasons.
For example, increasing the scope (generalizability) in
sciences (from physics to economy) is often done at the
expense of realism and accuracy by 1) omitting
relevant explanans (method of isolation), 2) having a
less accurate description of the explanans (method of
abstraction), or 3) introducing purposeful falsehoods in
the explanans or explanandum (idealizations). These
have scope implications, and future IS philosophy is
needed to understand all of these methods, including
prediction accuracy, and how they are implicitly or
explicitly used in IS.
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